Gregory of Nyssa
[M.1204] But let us examine the repercussions of the argument which claims that Only-Begotten God had an enfleshed mind. "If the Lord did not have an enfleshed mind, it would consist of wisdom." What a fallacious proposition! He maintains that another [Lord] exists who is composed of either one of these substances, enfleshed mind or wisdom. For [Apollinarius] this must be the constitution of [Christ]; if this is not the case because the mind is not enfleshed, [Christ] is undoubtedly wisdom, for mind cannot be enfleshed. What about a stone, a beetle or anything else which we may observe? [Apollinarius] will indeed attribute some other entity composed from these two properties, that is, either the enfleshed mind or wisdom. However, both mind and wisdom have nothing to do with these. Both the proposition and fraud attributed to their author perish along with his argument. Hence these two elements are identical: if one exists the other does not, or on the contrary, [J.188] if one does not exist, the other does exist. However, neither one or both of his propositions are thwarted. Let us examine the absurdity which follows from such a proposition. If [Apollinarius] asserts that the mind is not enfleshed, it would be wisdom; the contradiction is evident because if [Christ] is wisdom, the mind is not enfleshed. But everyone who admits wisdom to be Christ accepts the faith. According to the proposition of wisdom, we confess that [Christ] cannot have an enfleshed mind. Hence, with regard to the first and second proposition as well as the present one, our author formulates anything he wishes to show that the Lord is not an enfleshed mind. Such is his proposition and his assumption.
The conclusion [Apollinarius] realizes is worthy of both his propositions. What are his words? "The presence of God is not through Christ's dwelling but through a man's birth." Arrogant persons may denounce such remarks as these. However, we resist the temptation to be derisive, judging it more expedient both to weep over his misleading words and to challenge his conceited assumption. Who would not deride the incoherence of his syllogistic procedure? I will now quote his argument: "If the Lord did not have an enfleshed mind, wisdom, which is found in all men, would illumine the mind of man. If this is true, then the presence of Christ did not consist in God's dwelling with us but in a man's birth." No reverent person would deny that the Lord is wisdom. [M.1205] As the convincing evidence of the holy Fathers and Apostles testify, he transcends every mind. [J.189] Paul cries out, "God made [Christ] our wisdom" [1Cor 1.30]. Also, "The grace of salvation has appeared for us, training us to renounce impiety and worldly passions, and to live sober, upright, and godly lives in this world while awaiting our blessed hope" [Tit 2.11-13]. The Apostle has taught us that the Only-Begotten Son who is above, through and in all things, does not have an enfleshed mind. Neither do the saints hand on to us any novel teaching derived from divinely inspired scripture which describes [Christ] as having a monstrous nature. We pay special attention to the intent of this unorthodox writer who rejects with callous sophistry the Lord's wisdom, the very means by which we believe he enlightens every mind. In its place he introduces an absurd new teaching which gives a name to the mind of the enfleshed Only-Begotten [Son] while refraining to call him wisdom. "If the Lord is believed to be wisdom, the very one who manifested himself to each person who received grace, we no longer confess the abiding of God as Christ's presence among us as wisdom which had become alienated from God." Who cannot but pity the insanity of such a man? If he says that we believe [Christ] as wisdom, God's dwelling with us does not come from Christ "who was made for us wisdom by God" [1Cor 1.30] but from the birth of a man. And what if he were wisdom? Have you not heard the prophet crying out, "the virgin will conceive in her womb and will give birth to a son" [Is 7.14] and, "a child is born for us" [Is 9.5]? Finally, a strong, powerful son has the ruling authority laid upon his shoulder; this occurred not only in the past, but he is also the father of the age to come [vs. 6].
[亞波里拿流]發現結論對他的兩個命題都是有利的。他的話是什麼呢？『神的同在並不是透過基督的內住，而是透過人的出生。』傲慢自大的人會公開指著那種觀點。然而，我們抗拒嘲笑他們的誘惑，用更為有效的方式來評論它，以掃除他誤導人的話，並挑戰他幻想出來的假設。有誰不會嘲笑他那種三段論公式的前後不一？我現在引用他的論點：『如果主沒有一個被肉身包裹的心思、智慧，也是在所有的人裡面能夠找到的，能夠光照人的心思。如果這是真的，那麼基督的通知就與神住在我們的裡面不同，而是在人的出生中。』沒有任何敬虔的人會否定主就是智慧。[M.1205]就像聖教父們和使徒們所見證的，令人信服的證據表明的，祂超越所有的心思。[J.189]保羅高呼，『神讓[基督]成為我們的之後』[1Cor 1.30]。並且，『因為神救眾人的恩典已經顯明出來，教訓我們除去不敬虔的心和世俗的情慾，在今世自守、公義、敬虔度日，等候所盼望的福，並等候至大的神和（或作無和字）我們救主耶穌基督的榮耀顯現。』[Tit 2.11-13]使徒已經角度我們獨生子超越萬有，貫穿萬有也在萬有之中，並沒有過一個被肉身包裹的心思。那些聖徒們並沒有根據描述[基督]具有一種怪物之性質的，被神聖啟示的經文，交給我們任何怪異的教義。我們特別注意這種非正統作者的動機，他用剛硬的詭辯之術拒絕主的智慧，就是我們相信祂用來光照每一個心思的憑藉。取而代之的是一種荒謬的新教義，賦予被肉身包裹的獨生[子]一個名字，同時拒絕稱祂為智慧。『如果主被相信是智慧，就是那位想每一位領受恩典之人顯現的那位，我們就不再承認神作為基督的同在，如同那位變成與神不同的智慧一樣，住在我們中間。』誰能夠不可憐那些人的瘋狂無知？如果他說我們相信[基督]就是智慧，神豬雜我們裡面並不是從基督來的，而那位『神又使祂成為我們的智慧』[1Cor 1.30]的基督是被生成為人。如果祂是智慧呢？難道你沒有聽過先知呼喊說，『必有童女懷孕生子，給他起名』[Is 7.14]和，『因有一嬰孩為我們而生』[Is 9.5]嗎？最後，一個強而有力的兒子在賦予祂的權柄上掌權；這不僅僅是過去發生的事件，祂也是要來之時代的父。[vs. 6]
But let us reject this fantasy which claims [J.190] that an enfleshed mind is neither illuminating wisdom nor [Christ's] appearance by his birth into our human existence. He offers yet another argument: "The enfleshed mind was not the Word but wisdom." How can a wise person distinguish mind from wisdom and say that the two are different? Anyone who can accurately distinguish between two different realities says that life is opposed to death and death to life, evil to virtue and so forth. With this example of [M.1208] opposing realities in mind, how can wisdom be distinguished from mind since two entities cannot be one and the same thing? [Apollinarius] says, "If mind is not enfleshed, it is wisdom." This is as if one were to say that anyone not enjoying good health is ill. What is the argument here? "If wisdom is not present in the mind, the Lord did not descend to us nor did he empty himself." Observe the inevitable result of his argument! How can [Apollinarius] maintain that the Lord did not descend to reveal himself because he was wisdom? If his descent repudiates that wisdom comes from the Lord, then he who confesses this descent must deny [the Lord] as wisdom. However, Apollinarius acknowledges [Christ's] descent and that which has descended he does not believe to be wisdom. Such are the arguments opposed to the truth he offers concerning our [Lord's] birth. Then [Apollinarius] adds an unintelligible argument based upon a false assumption: "[Christ] was a man, for according to Paul, man is an enfleshed mind." I beseech my readers not to think that we are ridiculing this statement fabricated by Apollinarius, for his words enable us to comprehend [J.191] his argument. Does Paul say that the mind is enfleshed? Does [Apollinarius] have Paul imply something else? The Apostle who called himself a slave of Jesus Christ says nothing of the sort in all his writings. If his epistles do not bear this out, what is the origin of this strange, concocted doctrine? [Apollinarius] further adds, "That man [Christ] was both from the earth and from heaven." Again I refer to Gabriel's announcement to Mary upon whom we believe the Holy Spirit had descended. She was overshadowed by the power of the Most High; from her Jesus was born who bore the authority upon his shoulders, that is, he bore his own authority. This authority is indeed God the Word who was in the beginning and is the beginning [NB: arche means both authority and beginning] as the Word says in scripture, "I am the beginning" [Apoc 1.8]. Let it be known that either the Virgin did not exist on the earth or that the heavenly man was not made. Neither should one fear less educated persons who offend the divinity by accepting [Christ's] humanity while not confessing his divinity, for his humanity is born from woman while virginity points to a birth transcending man. Such is the case with the man [Christ] who was born; the power by which he came to birth does not come from man but from the power of the Most High through the Holy Spirit. Therefore, [Christ] is truly [M.1209] man and God; to the eye he is man, and to the mind, God. [Apollinarius] does not arrive at the conclusion that the divinity present in visible reality cannot be defined by the mind.
讓我們用以下的宣告拒絕這種幻想[J.190]，就是一個被肉身包裹的心思既不是光照人的智慧，也不是藉著祂出生進入我們人類的存有中之[神的]顯現。然而他還提供了另一個論點：『被肉身包裹的心思不是道，而是智慧。』一個智慧的人如何能夠把心思從智慧中分離出來，而說兩者是不同的？任何能夠正確的區分那兩個不同的實體的人，說生命與死亡相對、死亡與生命相對，邪惡與美德相對，等等。只要我們記得這種相對之實體的例子[M.1208]，智慧怎麼能夠從心思中被分離出來，難道因為兩個實體不能是一個同樣的東西嗎？[亞波里拿流]說，『如果心思沒有被肉身報告，就是智慧。』這就好像有人說，如果一個人缺少了健康，就是生病的人。這裡的論點到底是哦什麼？『如果智慧不在心思裡面，主就沒有降臨到我們中間，祂也沒有倒空自己。』我們要看清楚他的論點所造成的必然結果！[亞波里拿流]怎麼可能堅稱，因為主是智慧，所以祂沒有降臨世界並啟示自己？如果祂的降臨否定了智慧乃是從神而來，那麼，反承認這個降世的必然要否定[主]是智慧。然而，亞波里拿流承認[基督的]降世，然而他不相信那位降世的是智慧。他對於我們的[主的]出生提供的理論都與真理相互悖逆。藉著，[亞波里拿流]加上一種根據錯誤假設的荒謬論點：『因為，根據保羅，[基督]是一個人，人是一個被肉身包裹的心思。』我懇求我的讀者別人我我們在刁難這個由亞波里拿流炮製出來的宣告，因為他的語言讓我們能夠理解[J.191]他的論點。難到保羅說過心思是被肉身包裹的嗎？難到[亞波里拿流認為]保羅暗示的是另一種東西嗎？稱自己為耶穌基督的奴僕的保羅在他所有的作品中根本沒提過這件事。如過他的書信未曾提過這件事，那麼這個怪異，被捏造出來的教義是從哪裡來的？[亞波里拿流]還加上，『那個人[基督]既是同地而來，也是從天而來。』我再次引用加百列對那位我們相信被聖靈臨及的瑪利亞宣告的話。她被至高者的能力覆蓋；耶穌從她而生，在祂肩上負有全部，就是，祂背負著自己的全部。這個權柄事實上就是從起初就有，也就是起初的道神（God the Word）[NB: arche的意思同時是權柄和起始]，就好像道在聖經裡面說的，『我是起初』[Apoc 1.8]。讓大家看看，到底是童女根本未曾存在在地上過，抑或是那個屬天的人不是被造的。我們不要害怕那些因為接受[基督的]人性而干犯其神格的，在同時又不承認祂的神格的，那些沒有受過教育的人，因為祂的人性是從女人所生，而女人的童真指明那個畜生是超越萬人的。那個人[基督]就是這樣被生的；那個讓祂出生的能力不是從人來到，而是透過聖靈，從至高者的能力來到。故此，[基督]真是[M.1209]人，也是神；在人的眼中祂是人，但是對於人的心思而言，祂是神。[亞波里拿流]並沒有做出那個在可見的實體中顯現的神格不能被心思定義的結論。
But let us move on to the argument which follows: "If the mind is with God, then the human mind was in Christ." Such is his contention which we now reprove. Which saint [J.192] defined the divine mind? Which part of scripture has taught us that God consists of this mind, claims that the man Christ lacked a mind and that God became a mind devoid of reason? We are compelled to correct such abuse. However, I fear that we are not sufficiently derisive to our readers in our presentation of [Apollinarius'] unacceptable teaching which we have treated with contempt. In order to bring his idea to a completion, we only need to state its conclusion, and this I pass over as mere rubbish: "If the mind is with God and the human mind was in Christ, then the incarnation did not complete its work in him. If the incarnation was not accomplished by [Christ's] self-determination and uncoerced mind, any deed completed in the flesh such as sin's abolition comes from another self-determined movement and the divine mind. Our own self-determined freedom partakes of sin's abolition when united to Christ." Can you see the inevitable result of such a statement? I think that we could use an enchanter and a diviner here who discerns the mysteries of dreams to interpret such novelties. "The mind is self-determined yet is moved by an external force; the flesh completes its work by the abolition [of sin]." But I prefer that children ridicule such notions as these while we continue with the rest of the tract. "If anything great acquires further addition it is done with effort, while Christ who lacks a human mind requires no such effort." How can we reconcile this with divinely inspired scripture? What is the origin of Beseleel's skill [Ex 31.1] and [J.193] Solomon's knowledge? How does Amos, the pruner of sycamore trees, obtain the gift of prophecy from pasturing goats [Amos 7.14]? Similarly, none of these persons has descended from heaven nor did any of them exist in the beginning as an equal to God. [M.1212] But let us quickly pass over this argument in silence which brings to a conclusion [Apollinarius'] earlier remarks: "The human race is not saved by the assumption [analepsis] of mind and the whole man but by the taking up [proslepsis] of the flesh." Such is the conclusion of his argument. Here the cold terms of grammar interpret the difference between "assumption" and "taking up." And so, these parts of the text are called propositions which offer a brief systematization of discrepancies for school boys. We do not hesitate to interpret as identical that which was both assumed and taken up. David says, "With glory you have taken me up [proslambano] " [Ps 72.24]. And again, "He chose David his servant and took him up [analambano] from the flocks of his father's sheep" [Ps 77.70]. Therefore, "taken up with glory" and "taken from the flocks of his father" mean the same. Both words refer to one reality so that anyone not wishing to apply the word "assumption" to the Only-Begotten may say that he was "taken up" in accord with the mystery of the incarnation. Nevertheless, the meaning of each term can never be explained. But in my desire to escape submersion in the filth of [Apollinarius'] absurd words, I omit his monumental folly. I consider his position as meaningless, a conclusion reached from reading his text. Whoever wishes to vigorously inveigh against heresy cannot refute [J.194] such nonsense from his own reasoning.
讓我們來到下一個論點：『如果心思與神通知，那麼人類的心思就在基督裡面。』我們如今就是要播出他的論點。那一個聖人[J.192]曾經定義過神聖的心思？聖經的那一個部分教導我們神是由這個心思所構成的，宣稱那個人基督缺少了一個心思，並神成為一個缺少理性的心思？我們都被迫糾正那種荒謬的講法。然哦，我害怕我們不能充分的在讀者面前，用我們展示[亞波里拿流]那種不可能被接受的，並被我們輕視的教導，嘲笑他。為的完全的展現他的想法，我們只需要說出它的結論，我認為根本就是垃圾：『如果心思與神同在，並人類的心思在基督裡，那麼，道成肉身就沒有在祂裡面完成其工作。如果，道成肉身未曾被[基督]自己的決定和不被強迫的心思（self-determination 安定uncorerced mind）完成，任何在肉身中完成的動作，就好像廢除罪的行動來自另一個自我決定的行動和神聖的心思一樣。我們自己的自我決定的自由意志在於基督聯合的時候，有份於廢除罪的行動。』你們能夠看見那種宣告必然造成的結果嗎？我認為我們能夠在此使用一個巫師和一個占卜者來分辨夢的奧秘並詮釋那種新奇的說法。『心思是自我決定的，然而也被外在的力量所推動；肉身藉著廢除[罪]完成它的工作。』但是，我寧願讓孩童來嘲笑那種觀點，而我們能夠繼續討論剩下的部分。『如果任何要求而外增強的偉大，就需要努力才能更完成，在同時，基督缺少人類的心思，就不需要那樣的努力。我們怎能能夠將這個觀點與神聖啟示的經文調和呢？比撒列[Ex 31.1]和[J.193]所羅門知識的起源是什麼？阿摩斯，一個修理桑樹的人，怎麼能夠從吃草的羊身上得到先知的恩賜呢[Amo 7.14]？同樣的，這些人都不是從天上降下來的，他們也沒有一個人從起初就是存在的，並與神同等。[M.1212]但是，讓我們快快的跳過這個代表稍早指出的，總結[亞波里拿流]的論點：『人類並不是藉著取得[assumption, analepsis]心思並取得全人被拯救的，而是藉著佔用[take up, proslepsis，也可作揀選]肉身。』那就是他的論點的結論。在此，文法中冷酷的詞彙詮釋了『取得』和『佔用』間的不同。並且，本文中的那些被稱作命題的不同部分，為學童們提供了簡要的，系統化的矛盾。我們會毫不留情的將取得和佔用詮釋為同樣的意義。大衛說，『你用榮耀佔用了我[proslambano]』[Ps. 72.24]（無法找到相應經節，根據英文翻譯——譯者）。並且，『又揀選祂的僕人大衛，從他父親的羊群中揀選了[analambano]他』[Ps 77.70]。因此，『以榮耀佔用』和『從他父的羊群中佔用』具有同樣的意義。兩個字都指著同一個實體，以至於任何不願意把『取得（assumption）』用在獨生者身上的人能夠說，祂根據道成肉身的奧秘被『佔有』。即便如此，每一個詞的意義從未能夠被解釋。但是，我不想被[亞波里拿流]荒謬的語言的汙穢淹沒。我將會忽略他具有時代意義的愚蠢。根據閱讀了他的本文做出的結論，我認為他的立場是毫無意義的。任何想要竭力抨擊異端的人不能用自己的推理駁斥[J.194]那種無意義的說法。
[Apollinarius] states his falsehood with a weak defense which reveals his impiety as follows: "If the perfect God were united to perfect man, they would be two." The imperfect united with what is perfect cannot be considered as two regarding [Christ]. Can you not see that this distinguished gentleman is unable to count children upon the fingers of his hands? In numbering the small as one with the great, he calls one less and the other greater. He says both are the same when taken together. Every number is an aggregate of individual units denoting a total sum. If anything we can count is added to something else which can be counted with it, this sum is larger than the smaller number, for the number one is insignificant by itself because magnitude is lacking. When considering two things of equal size, we speak of two similar elements, but when we count the less with the great [M.1213] we also speak of two. However, one is inferior and the other is complete. A person proficient in arithmetic says that if the nature of each is complete, they are two. But if the inferior and the great form a unit, I do not know how they can be joined and how unity can result from opposing, irreconcilable elements. When two complete entities are united as in the similar case of two inferior entities, they form a likeness. But when we have a unity of opposites as in the case of the inferior with the complete, I will leave the means of explaining this dilemma to the inventor of such novel arithmetic.
The human mind's mutability cannot know the Only-Begotten God and speak of its origin. Therefore, [Apollinarius] maintains [J.195] that God did not assume flesh. Our author does not deny the flesh's mutability extending from youth to old age as though these various stages have put on other clothing. How could the immutable [God] be cared for by his mother, advance to childhood and adolescence, thereby arriving at maturity and the fullness human growth? If [Apollinarius] spurns the mind because it is mutable, the flesh should not be attributed to [Christ]; thus the entire Gospel will be seen as false, and our faith along with its proclamation would be worthless. If he believes that [Christ] appeared in mutable flesh, he should also recognize the mind; rather, just as [Christ] did not suffer defilement through his birth in the flesh, neither is the mind altered by assuming mutability. I refer once more to this matter using [Apollinarius'] own words: "The human race and the entire man is not saved by the assumption of mind but by assuming flesh, its natural governing principle. The immutable mind does not require submission to the flesh by any defect in knowledge; rather, it unites the flesh to itself without coercion." Everybody knows that an inferior being differs in nature from a superior one and that the nature of anything which has come into existence to rule also requires a governing principle. Thus irrational animals are subject to man's dominion. Man does not have a newly acquired rule over these beasts, but it is something proper to him. If, as Apollinarius believes, it is natural for the flesh [M.1216] to be ruled and the divinity to govern by reason of its nature, how can he say that one nature can be divided into two right from the beginning? For [J.196] one nature is clearly subject and another, reason, is superior. A created nature requires administration while another nature performs the act of governing. If another nature is composed of contrary elements, I mean flesh and divinity, how can these two be one? How can the Word form the divine, heavenly flesh? The preexistent Word himself who was made flesh in these last days did not assume our form but always existed in his divine state. [Apollinarius] claimed that the immutable [Christ] required flesh and guidance and that our flesh is subject to sin due to its mutability. But if the body is celestial and divine, as he says with regard to the Word, neither does he follow through by ascribing to him mutability nor a need for direction. It is God's teaching, not ours, which says that ill persons require a doctor, not the healthy [Mt 9.12]. There is no sickness of sin in heaven but we are the ones suffering sin's effects who are weakened by our consent to evil. We who have been changed into sin have great need of immutability since after we have turned away from the way of salvation, we need the good. If our author attributed this condition to our Lord's flesh, namely, that although he was immutable, he disposed himself to be led and to require guidance, then [Apollinarius] has only spoken of our own human constitution. If the flesh constrains the divinity, whatever he claims it to be, this flesh does not require something else for guidance (for it is free from change and inclination towards evil). In vain then, he contrives terms for the Lord's flesh [J.197]. If the flesh is divine, it is clearly immutable; if mutable, it is not divine.
[M.1217] Who can follow this confused, inconsistent tale which wanders all over the place like a dreamy fantasy manifesting itself under various forms? At one time [Apollinarius] says that the Word's divine flesh is co-eternal; at another time that it is acquired and assumed, and still again, that it is alien to our human nature which is subject to passion and death and in need of guidance due to its mutability and subjection to passions' whims. And so, [Apollinarius] attributes irrationality to the divine flesh that the divinity may heal it just as God both guides and protects the irrational behavior of men. He therefore claims that destitution of mind is more blessed, provided that God assumes this condition. Why does he disprove of Solomon who says, "The intelligent [man] will gain direction" [Prov 1.5]? I do not think that the mystery of this proverb refers to direction, only that evil throws our human nature into confusion and results in shipwreck. For this reason we require guidance from the true Pilot's command to reach the harbor of the divine will. If man is saved by not being rational, how will the intelligent man possess sovereignty? To which nature is the divinity more inclined, rather, to which nature is reason properly subjected in order to possess the divine nature? Flesh is crass, dense and has an affinity with the earth while mind is invisible and lacks shape. Who does not know which is more in harmony with God, the crass and earthly or the invisible and formless? How, as [Apollinarius] says, can flesh be united to God without coercion and share in pure virtue? [J.198] For who does not know that the proper activity of free choice is virtue? The flesh is an instrument of free choice led by the impulse of discretion to whatever it desires, for free choice is nothing other than mind and disposition. If [Apollinarius] says that man partakes of pure virtue which lacks mind, what freely acknowledges virtue? Perhaps our author is thinking about something subject to constraint, not something free from such restriction. When the mind is not disposed towards the good and the body is not engaged in evil deeds, we have necessity, not free choice, for a desirable end. However, when a person makes a rational judgment for the good, it is necessarily superior, and his life naturally tends towards the good. How can our author say the [Christ] has freedom of choice while lacking the capacity to make free choice and while his very own reason cannot chose the good? Sinlessness [M.1220] would not result from choice nor be worthy of special praise; we do not laud those persons who are bound by chains and hindered from evil since they forsake evil deeds by constraint, not by choice.
"But the divinity attracts the flesh without coercion." Here [Apollinarius] clearly speaks of unconstrained free will. But how does [Christ] apply himself to virtue when he lacks free will? Choice, the act of willing, to opt for the good and to avoid being mislead are efforts of the mind yet transcend the reach of a person who lacks a mind. If the flesh is united to God without coercion, our author testifies that it neither lacks free will, acts irrationally, nor lacks guidance towards a worthwhile goal. However, no one has ever said that the flesh lacked reason, for how can reason be present in a nature which lacks reason? Not only is the mind in man by [J.199] what [Apollinarius] says, but it is his most noble attribute. The free, unconstrained inclination for the good is perfect testimony for the mind. Also his ensuing words show that the mind is inclined towards the good: "Pure virtue shares in everything subject to the mind." If virtue's purity is in the mind, how does he exclude the mind from [Christ's] in which he also acknowledges purity? A choice must be made here; either mind can share in virtue or the flesh lacks mind when freely united to virtue.
The preceding words were both incoherent and inconsistent, so it would not be worth our effort to carefully examine what now follows a similar vain: "Persons resembling Christ with respect to the mind also resemble him with respect to the flesh." Such revolting words present an erroneous teaching to their admirers. But let us quote once more from [Apollinarius'] himself: "If God had united himself to man, he is perfect with that which is perfect, for they are two: one is Son of God by nature and the other is [son of God] by adoption." I simply wish to learn that if the adopted son is perfect and endowed with mind, what does [Apollinarius] call the man which, he says, lacks reason and mind? The Only-Begotten God is complete and perfect because this appellation of the true Son can be verified by his nature. But what is an addition to a half-complete man called? If Apollinarius says that the adopted son is perfect man, [M.1221] the half-complete man, insofar as he is man, is clearly a half-God and aptly named because the term adoption results from division. If we wish to clearly say that the perfect man is adopted, then this [J.200] half or deficient third part is in accord with those persons who wish to chop the man [Christ] into little pieces. But if it is improper for God to have an adopted son, the same may be equally said with respect to the perfect and imperfect man. The result of this is an absurd mutilation. If the perfection of human nature is applied to the divinity, we would have something disgraceful along with a conception not worthy of God. How much more disgraceful would his mutilated nature appear! If [Christ] does not have a mind, flesh comes from the Father but does not belong to his essence. Similarly, the person of the Son both taken as a whole and in his various aspects differs according to the law of nature; neither can our mind nor body be associated with the [divine] transcendent nature by reason of their essence. When confronted with a myth about the divinity which fabricates a heavenly form of flesh, a perceptive person would deny that such flesh is consubstantial with God and the Father. If the flesh is alien to the Father's substance, how can the Son be alien from his Father? He who has his origin from another person does not have another essence but differs only with regard to him who begets. But the Father is not flesh, and he who comes from the Father is not flesh, for what is born from spirit is spirit and is not flesh [Jn 3.6]. If the flesh is not from the Father, the Son is not from the Father. What is that flesh called? We will apply to human flesh whatever name for that heavenly flesh the author [Apollinarius] has concocted, and so both our human nature and [Christ's] will have the same name. [J.201] The Son does not have his origin from the earth nor is the Son heavenly [according to Apollinarius]; an adopted son has his origins from the earth just as [Apollinarius' heavenly son]. Hence, we have two sons. One son [according to Apollinarius] is composed of flesh and divinity who comes from the earth. Since all creation is nothing when compared to the divine nature, we confess that the Father equally transcends heaven and earth.
前面那些話都是自我矛盾和前後不一的，所以，它根本不值得我們仔細檢視，接下來的話也是同樣的無價值：『在心思上效法基督的人也在肉身的方面效法基督。』這種自相循環的話代表了被他們景仰之人的錯誤教訓。但是，讓我們再次引用[亞波里拿流]自己的話：『如果神親自與人聯合，對於完美的而言，祂是完美的，因為祂們是兩位：一位根據其性質是神的兒子，另一位是因著認養而成為[神的兒子]。』我只想簡單的學習，如果被認養的兒子是完美的，並被賦予心思，[亞波里拿流]要怎麼稱呼那個他成為植物缺少理性和心思的人？獨生的神是完全和完美的，因為這個真兒子的稱呼可以根據祂的性質被確認。但是，那個被加給半個完全的人（the half-complete man）的東西的名字是什麼？如果亞波里拿流說那個被認養的兒子是完全的人，[M.1221]那半個完美的人，在這個程度上他還是人，很明顯的就是半個神（a half God）並且也當得到那個稱呼，因為認養這個詞是分割的結果。如果我們希望明確的說那個完全的人是被認養的，那麼，根據那些人，他們想要把這個[J.200]半個，或失效的第三個部分切成碎片。但是，如果神不適合認養一個兒子，我們對於完全並不完全的人也能說同樣的話。這就造成一直荒謬的切斷。如果人性的完全被用在神格上面，我們就會得到某種從不符合神的觀念所產生的，羞辱性的結果。祂那種被切斷的性質還想要用什麼羞辱的方式顯明啊！如果[基督]沒有一個心思，從父而來的肉身就不屬於祂的素質。同樣的，子的位格同時被當作政權的，並更具性質的律，在許多方面都是不同的；我們的心思和舌頭都不能因著它們的素質的緣故，與[神聖]超越的性質產生任何關係。當他們面對的神格的奧秘，而炮製出一個肉身的屬天形式的時候，凡有辨別力的人就會否認那種肉身是與神和父同質的。如果肉身與父的實質不同，子怎麼可能與祂的父不同呢？凡是源自於另一個人的，不會擁有另一個素質，僅僅是與那位生他的不同。但是，如不是肉身，那位從父而來的也不是肉身，因為從靈生的就是靈，不是肉身[Jn 3.6]。如果肉身不是從父來的，子就不是從父來的。那麼，那個肉身要叫做什麼？不論那位作者[亞波里拿流]為那個屬天的肉身（heavenly flesh）捏造了什麼樣的名稱，我就就稱之為人類的肉身（human flesh），好讓我們的人性和[基督的]意志能夠得到同樣的名稱。[J.201]子的起源並不是地，也不是[根據亞波里拿流]屬天的；一個被認養的兒子其起源必然是地，就好像[亞波里拿流的屬天兒子]一樣。因此，我們就得到了兩個兒子。一個兒子[根據亞波里拿流]是由肉身所構成的，祂的神格來自地。因為當我們把所有的被造物與神性做比較的時候，是一文不值，我們承認父同時超越天和地。
Something remains which has charity as its goal, namely, to consider what is more befitting of God. This does not consist in determining [Christ's] name but in bestowing a name of great value and power resembling the ocean. If a person were to swallow a drop of salt water which [M.1224] conveys the quality of the sea, in similar fashion the true, Only-Begotten Son who is inaccessible light, wisdom, power, every exalted name and conception, manifests himself to men through the flesh. But the flesh's own nature is transformed into the incorruptible sea. As the Apostle says, "What is mortal is swallowed up by life" [2Cor 5.4]. Every corporeal manifestation is transformed into the divine, immortal nature. Neither weight, form, color, solidity, softness, quantity nor anything visible remains; the humble nature of the flesh is taken up to be united with the divinity and to assume its properties.
某些事情的目標必須明確，特別是關於神的事情。這與與決定[基督]的稱呼不一致，而是用一個如果海洋的價值和大能的能力。如果一個人被一滴帶著海洋性質的鹽水所吞沒[M.1224]，在某種類似的真理的方式中，獨生子是不可接觸的光、智慧、能力、每一個高舉的名和觀念、親自透過肉身彰顯自己。但是，肉身自己的性質被變化成為不可改變的還有。就像使徒說的，『必死的被生命吞滅』[2 Cor 5.4]。每一個物質的彰顯都被轉變為神聖、不死的性質。不是重量、樣子、顏色、固定性、柔軟性、數量，也不是任何看得見的事物；肉身卑賤的性質被取得，並與神格聯合，神格也取得了其屬性。
Apollinarius' fabrication directed against us asserts, "The four names of the Trinity present no danger; we should not subject angels as slaves to men." Those who serve the man [Christ] subject themselves to the Lord; they are not ashamed to worship him who made his home in the world through the flesh. "When he brings the first-born into the [J.202] world, it is said, 'Let all God's angels worship him'" [Heb 1.6]. Only one entry into this world is possible, human birth, for no other way exists. Scripture also calls birth through the flesh our entrance into the world. If all the angels worship [Christ's] entry into the world--and his entry is through the flesh--we have not reduced the Lord to a slave's condition; rather, the angels acknowledge his transcendent lordship. Thus let [Apollinarius] who brings forth such vain ideas be silent. His arguments compel us to make earth into heaven, thereby reducing to servitude the God-bearing angels along with the God-bearing man.
亞波里拿流的小說直接與我們所堅信的相悖逆，『三位一體的四個名字不是有害的；我們不當認為天使是人類的僕役。』那些服侍人[基督]是自我順服主；它們對於敬拜那位藉著肉身在世界中安家的那位，不會感覺羞恥。『當祂把首生的（first boen）帶入[J.202]世界裡面的時候，聖經說，‘讓神的天使們都敬拜祂’』[Heb 1.6]。進入這個世界只有一個如果，人類的出生，不可能存在別的方式。聖經也稱透過肉身的出生為我們進入世界的大門。如果所有的天使都敬拜[基督的]進入世界—祂的進入世界是透過肉身的—我們就絕不將主降低到奴僕的境況中；反而，天使們承認祂超越萬有的主權。故此，讓發明那種虛空的觀念的[亞波里拿流]閉口不言與為背負神的人（God-bearing man）降低成為奴僕。
To these considerations [Apollinarius] adds, "If the true God has received God, there are many gods since this multitude receives God." What is our response? "God was in Christ reconciling [M.1225] the world to himself" [2Cor 5.19] to which the great Paul was a honorable witness. If our author thinks that we proclaim a multitude of gods due to our confession that God reconciled in Christ the world to himself by becoming united with men, we offer the following defense: if there were many virgins who were also mothers, and if the revelation [of Christ's birth] came by Gabriel to many persons, the descent of the Holy Spirit and the divine power has descended upon them all. If the prophets proclaimed grace to many persons, children were born for us, sons were given for us, virgins were conceived in the womb and all who were born received the name Emmanuel. If everyone treaded upon waves and an ineffable power fell upon those thousands [J.203] in the desert, they have multiplied bread and the disciples distributed it. If all were dead for four days, they experienced the resurrection. If everyone were lambs of God, they offered themselves as a Paschal sacrifice for us, nailed sin to the cross, loosened the bonds of death, ascended into heaven before the disciples and sat at the Father's right hand. If the entire world came to be judged in righteousness and confessed the name of every celestial power both upon earth and beneath it, we would attribute many gods if such evidence were available. But if there is one Lord Jesus who brings everything into existence--"from him, through him and in him are all things" [Rom 11.36]--and if the enumeration of names befitting God refer to him alone, what danger is there in forming many gods when we claim that God has appeared through flesh and was endowed with a human soul? Was [Christ] who became manifest a man ignorant of the Gospel teaching and the salvation he offered to the Jews? "Now you seek to kill me, a man who has told you the truth" [Jn 8.40]. Can you not see in [Christ's] words an occasion to kill him when he said "Now you seek to kill me?" It is not the truth they wish to kill but the man by whom truth speaks. It was not man uttering the truth but God who was clearly speaking while man mediated [God's] message to men using his own voice. [Christ] is mediator between God and men since human nature cannot experience a pure union with God and have kinship with him. Therefore, the heavenly power approaches him by means of [Christ's] human voice. But let us leave these considerations behind us and turn our attention to the following: [M.1228 & J.204] "Nothing," says [Apollinarius], "can be united to God such as the flesh which was assumed." Oh, what a judicious statement! Nothing can be united to God such as flesh, goodness, eternity, incorruptibility, omnipotence, nor any thought befitting God; all these secondary characteristics are judged as inferior to the flesh when it is united with God. However, [Apollinarius] confesses that he who assumed flesh made known his coming upon earth.
[亞波里拿流]還為那些顧慮加上，『如果真神已經接受了神，那麼就有許多的神，因為這許多的神跡手了神。』我們的回應是什麼呢？『神在基督裡[M.1225]將世界與自己和好了』[2Cor 5.19]，這是偉大保羅的尊貴見證。如果我們的作者因著我們承認神在基督裡，藉著成為與人聯合的，而讓世界與自己和好了，而認為我們宣傳許多的神，我們將會提供以下的辯護：如果有許多的童女都是母親，如果[關於基督誕生的啟示]從加百列臨及許多人，聖靈和神聖能力降臨在他們所有的人身上。如果先知向多人宣告恩典，許多孩童為我們生，許多兒子被賜給我們，童女在母腹中成孕，這所有被生出來的人都得到了以馬內利的名字。如果有任何人能夠踏在浪上面，無法言喻的大能降臨在沙漠中的千人身上[J.203]，他們讓餅增多並讓門徒分給眾人。如果每一個人都死了四天，他們經歷了復活。如果每一個人都是神的羔羊，他們就會為了我們把自己獻上，作為逾越節的羔羊，把罪釘在十字架上，釋放死人身上的捆鎖，在信徒之前就高升到天上，坐在父的右手邊。如果整個世界能夠被公義審判，並承認所有在地上並在地底下的屬天能力之名，如果能夠得到那樣的證據，我們就會承認有許多神。但是如果只有一位讓萬有得以存在的主耶穌——『從祂、透過祂並在祂裡面萬有的一存在』[Rom 11.36]——如果那數不盡被用來描述神的名字都僅僅是指著祂所說的，難道此處的危險不是當我們宣傳神藉著肉身顯現，並被賦予一個人類的魂，而塑造了許多神嗎？難道那位顯現為人的[基督]不知道福音書的教義並祂提供給猶太人的救贖嗎？『如今你們想要殺我，因為我告訴你們真理』[Jn 8.40]。（根據英文重譯——譯者）難道你們沒有看見[基督的]話，就是當祂被殺的時候，祂說『你們現在想要殺我嗎？』他們並不是要殺死真理，而是要殺死那位說出真理的人。並不是人說出真理，而是當人把[神的]資訊用自己的聲音說給人聽的時候，神清楚的說話了。[基督]就是神和人之間的中保，因為人性不可能經歷與神純淨的聯合，並與神類同。故此，屬天的能力藉著[基督的]人類聲音為媒介，臨及他。但是，讓我們先別管這些，把我們的注意力轉向接下來的話：[M.1128&J.204][亞波里拿流]說，『沒有任何事物能夠與神聯合，就像被取得的肉身。』哦！真是真知灼見啊！沒有任何事物能夠與神聯合，就像肉身、良善、永恆、不朽壞性、無所不在性、並任何屬於神的想法；所以，當那些次級的特徵與神聯合的時候，都被判定為比肉身還此等。然而，[亞波里拿流]承認，那位取得肉身的，讓全世界知道祂臨及世界。
We therefore pass over [Apollinarius' words] in silence since they are harmless, insubstantial fables. When he said that nothing attributed to God can be united to the Lord [Jesus] as the flesh which he had assumed, he has realized that nothing can be united with [God] nor be adored. He concludes with another flourish of his pen, "Nothing can be adored, for example, the flesh of Christ." We remain silent with regard to this absurd folly which is obvious even to children. Such children who sit and play in the market place would reason as follows: if nothing can be adored such as the flesh, then the flesh of Christ is worthy of more reverence than the Father's majesty and all-powerful authority which governs everything. And if any part of our human nature can speak of the divine power, we have left behind worship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit as alone worthy of adoration and prefer the flesh to which we ascribe all power. Indeed [Apollinarius'] words above are similar to what now follows: "The flesh of the Lord is to be adored inasmuch as there is one person and [J.205] one living being with him." He mentions two elements, the Lord and the flesh of the Lord, which compose one living being. Now the inscription to his tract clearly reveals the divine incarnation in man's likeness. Since the soul joined to the body is a unity formed from different elements of which human life consists and the distinguishing mark of our human constitution is this union of soul and body, our author [M.1229] is quick to say in his inscription concerning the divine power's manifestation that the divinity appears in the flesh according to the likeness of man. [Apollinarius] clearly says that there is one person and one living being or the flesh and the Lord, as if Paul claimed that what is manifest is present in what is hidden on account of the body's affinity with the soul. What action can we take against such claims? How can anyone accuse us of insensitivity and of fabricating false ideas? Let us consider the following statement: "Nothing created is to be adorned as belonging to the Lord, for example, his flesh."
Who can decide which irreverence is worse, that of Apollinarius or of Eunomius? Which one has exerted himself more vigorously against the truth? It seems that both are successful in presenting their equally sacrilegious opinions. One maintains that the Only-Begotten God is created and does not deny any difference between his mind and corporeal nature. This view professes that right from the beginning [Christ] was fashioned from two natures, flesh and divinity, and he is one living being in the likeness of human nature. [J.206] Both ascribe worship to a created being; however, [Eunomius] declares that [Christ's] nature is intellectual and incorporeal. [Christ's] nature is corporeal, and we should adore it instead of other creatures just as irreverent adoration is attributed to other creatures which the followers of Eunomius confess. Therefore, let us attribute victory against Eunomius, and let it be known that he has been adorned with the crown of impiety. Inasmuch as the body is deemed inferior the soul, when referring to those who worship the flesh among creatures, [Apollinarius] says that the worship of an intelligent creature is an especially flagrant breech of impiety. Also, if he claims that other creatures are to be worshiped, the flesh, by comparison, is worthy of a higher degree of worship. [Apollinarius] says, "Nothing created is to be worshiped, for example, the flesh of the Lord." All creatures are nothing before the divine power whether they be incorporeal or corporeal. But creation is composed of both great and small elements, and the incorporeal nature is more worthy of honor than anything which is sensible and corporeal. Just as Eunomius and Apollinarius attribute worship to a created being, both are equally worthy of disrespect. However, he who prefers the intellectual nature over the flesh is guilty of a greater impiety. Let the followers of such misunderstanding pay attention to our words directed against their teacher and the charge brought against him.
[M.1232] Let us see how the following shackles, that is, Apollinarius' teaching, present us with an indissoluble syllogistic chain of thought: "If anyone thinks that a man, rather than all men and angels, is bound with God..." We feel compelled [J.207] to examine the meaning of this statement. For the purpose of clarification, I cannot say which is better: to ask whether or not a stone has a soul or wood has understanding. Instead, we simply have a confirmation of his impiety. Nevertheless, the context of these words should attest to such nonsense as follows: "Angels and men lack free will because flesh does not have this capacity. Rather, corruption of our innate free will is not free will, for nature cannot be corrupted by its Maker and so, man is not united to God." What an argument we have here! How indissoluble are the webs of such syllogisms! The free will of men and angels which makes union with God possible is destroyed, and the corruption of our innate free will is not free will. What does this ventriloquist mean here? What are these voices and vain teachings emanating from the earth? If men and angels lack free will, human nature is united to God. Is it not a man who says, "Do you not seek to kill me, a man who has spoken the truth to you" [Jn 8.40]? Was he who manifested the divine power not united with the divine nature when he showed the works he freely wished to accomplish? If this was not the case, the witness of the Gospels are false. [Apollinarius] asserts that Paul, the prophets and all who proclaimed the wonders of the Lord were false, along with those who recounted [Christ's] deeds. If God had truly manifested himself in the flesh and the flesh which became united to the divine nature was one with it, then according to [Apollinarius'] fable, free will perished while human nature and the angels were reduced [J.208] to slavery. As a result, they both forfeited the grace of free will. What an absurd novelty we have here! [Apollinarius] continues, "The corruption of our innate free will means that we are deprived of it." [M.1233] Is not a slave counted among animals because he does not freely have control over his destiny but is subject to another person? For the author [Apollinarius] defines a living being by free will yet ordains that a person devoid of it is not a living being. Therefore Canaan was dead when he became subjected to his brothers through impudence [Gen 9.25]; the slave of Abraham was dead [Gen 24.2] as well as the boy Gehazi belonging to Elisha [2Kg 5.27] and in later times Onesimus [Philem 10] was considered dead along with all the governing authorities [Rom 13.1]. What can I say about them? All are subject to authority which hinders free will. But those transcendent authorities whom Paul decrees to be subject are indeed dead; even if they are endowed with souls, they perish and are no longer alive. Apollinarius propagates his fable for the purpose of uniting to the God over all things flesh without a soul, whether it happens to be souless or lacking a mind. His fable has both points equally in mind. But to be dead means to have no soul. A beast is alive without reason, a fact which [Apollinarius] does not deny as ridiculous after he had removed free will from [Christ's] flesh. Irrational beasts naturally do not have power over themselves but are subject to man's domination.
[M.1232]讓我們看看以下的腳銬，就是亞波里拿流的教導，如何向我們展示一種不可分解的三段論式的思維：『如果任何人認為一個人，而不是全人和全部的天使與神綁在一起。。。』我們覺得被迫需要[J.207]去檢視這句話的意義。為了澄清的緣故，我不能說那一個是更好的：去詢問石頭是否有一個魂，抑或是木頭具有理解力。反而，我們只要肯定他的不敬虔就好了。有鑑於此，那些話的上下文當被驗證為荒謬的，就是：『天使和人缺少自由意志，因為肉身並沒有這個能力。反而，我們內在自由意志的敗壞就是沒有自由意志，因為本性不能因著它的創造者等等被敗壞，人不是與神聯合的。』我們在此看見一種很等偉大的徐昂啊！那種三段論的網絡是如何無法被打破！人和天使那個使得他們能夠與神聯合變為可能的自由意志完全被摧毀，我們內在自由意志的敗壞不是自由意志。這種耍嘴皮子的人在這裡到底講的是什麼意思？這些噪音和虛假的教義是從地的那個部分發展出來的？如果人和天使沒有自由意志，人性與神聯合。難道那說『我將在神那裡所聽見的真理告訴了你們，現在你們卻想要殺我』[Jn 8.40]不是一個人嗎？難道那位在展示祂自願完成的工作時候，彰顯了神聖的能，但是卻沒有與神性聯合嗎？如果不是這樣，福音書的見證就是假的。[亞波里拿流]簡稱保羅、眾先知、並所有宣揚主的奇妙作為的人，再加上詳細敘述[基督的]作為的人，都是騙子。如果神確實在肉身中彰顯自己，而肉身確實與神性聯合為一，那麼，根據[亞波里拿流的]神話，自由意志在人性和天使被減為[J.208]僕役的時候就被消滅了。這就會造成，他們喪失了自由意志的恩典。我們在此看見的是何等荒謬的新奇理論！[亞波里拿流]繼續說，『我們內在自由意志的敗壞意味著我們被剝奪了自由意志。』[M.1233]難道一個奴僕因為他不能自由的控制他的命運，而必須順從另一個人，就不算為禽獸嗎？作者[亞波里拿流]用自由意志定義來定義一個活物，卻又以此斷定人缺少自由意志而不是一個活物。故此，迦南當受咒詛，必給他弟兄作奴僕的奴僕[Gen 9.25]；亞伯拉罕的奴僕死了[Gen 24.2]，又好像基哈西的孩童屬於以利沙一樣[2Kg 5.27]，並之後的歐尼西姆[Philem 10]被認為與其他管理的全部[Rom 13.1]一同被算為死的。我還能說他們什麼呢？所有順服全部的都沒有自由意志。而那些保羅所謂超越權柄的反而都是死人；即便它們都有魂，他們還是滅亡不再活著。亞波里拿流鼓吹他編織出來的小說，為的是把神與一個沒有魂的肉身聯接在一起，不過那個肉身是否是無魂的，抑或是缺少心思。他的小說同時具有這兩種觀點。但是，死的意思就是沒有魂。一隻野獸是活的，大水牛沒有理想，這是[亞波里拿流]沒有否定的荒謬事實，就是他把自由意志從[基督的]肉身中除去。非理性的野獸很自然的沒有自身的能力，順服人類的管理。
But let us omit these considerations and move on by briefly paraphrasing the [J.209] content of [Apollinarius'] thought: "Man consists of three parts, spirit, soul and body" as the Apostle says in his [first] letter to the Thessalonians [5.23]. [Apollinarius] quotes from the song of the three young men, "Bless [the Lord], spirits and souls of the just" [Dan 3.86] and adds, "In spirit serve the Lord" [Rom 1.9]. He continues with words from the Gospel which teaches us to worship God in spirit [Jn 4.23]. [Apollinarius] also says that the flesh is at enmity with the spirit. By claiming the flesh to be animate he shows that the spirit is a third entity in addition to soul and body. "If man consists of these three elements, the Lord is a man. Therefore, the Lord consists of three elements, spirit, soul and body." We will now briefly treat each of these three points to show that the divine scriptures do not affirm his position. First, let us begin with the Apostle Paul who did not [M.1236] divide man into three parts. According to our text of First Thessalonians [5.23], Paul prayed to the Lord to sanctify us in body, soul, and spirit. The teaching about the excellence of free choice is not in this passage alone but is in the letter to the Corinthians [1Cor 3.1, 15.44]. Paul knew that man is both carnal and spiritual as well as having animal life. He calls "flesh" our passionate, material life, while the spirit consists of what is not weighed down by corporeal enticements and has mind raised on high. Paul accurately terms "animal" that which is neither of these [J.210] yet shares in their existence. He also claims that neither the fleshly man is destitute of mind, the soul's functions, nor of the spirit which is alien by reason of its union with soul and body; similarly, neither does the animal man lack mind nor flesh; rather, Paul presents us with numerous names for the function of free will. "He who judges everything is judged by no one" [1Cor 2.15]; if man is composed of flesh and soul he is also called spiritual. A person maddened by the flesh's passion to violate his father's bed [1Cor 5.1] possesses neither soul nor mind. Similarly, the person standing midway between praiseworthy or despicable behavior partakes of both; he has own mind and is clothed with flesh. But as it is said, persons devoted to life's pleasures may be termed carnal and fond of disputes. Those who are capable of discernment are not susceptible of judgment by other person and are called spiritual by reason of their ethical way of life. Paul continues to speak of our natural human tendency which is inferior to the spiritual just as the spiritual is superior to the carnal. Since he wishes the animal part to be perfect through virtue not only by a sublime manner of life but to have God in mind while performing our bodily functions, no aspect of our human nature is unmindful of God ("Whether you eat, drink or do anything, do all to the glory of God" [1Cor 10.31]. Hence our bodily actions do not fail to glorify God).
然而，讓我們忽略那些顧慮，繼續簡要的解釋[亞波里拿流]思想的內容[J.209]：『人是由三個部分構成的，靈、魂和身體』就好像使徒在他的[第一封]帖撒羅尼加書[5.23]中所說的一樣。[亞波里拿流]引用了三個年輕人之歌，『讚美[主]，公義的眾靈與眾魂』[Dan 3.86]並『用靈侍奉主』[Rom 1.9]。他繼續用福音書中教導我們要在靈裡面敬拜神[Jn 4.23]的話。[亞波里拿流]還說肉身與靈為敵。藉著宣傳肉身被點活，他表面靈是在魂和身體外第三個附加的部分。『如果人由那三個元素構成，主就是人。故此，主是由三個元素，靈、魂和身體所構成的。』我們如今將會簡要的一個一個的處理那三個點，好表明神聖的經文並沒有認可他的立場。首先，讓我們用使徒保羅的話開始，他的話[M.1236]並沒有把人分成三個部分。根據我們的帖撒羅尼加前書[5.23]的經文，保羅向主禱告，希望聖別我們的身體、魂和靈。關於自由意志之美妙的教義根本不在這段話中，而是在哥林多書中[1Cor 3.1, 15.44]。保羅知道人是屬肉體，也是屬靈的，也具有動物的生命。他稱我們具有情感和物質的生命為『肉體』，在同時，靈包括無法被物質的誘惑所衡量的部分，並擁有一個被升到高處的心思。保羅正確的用『動物』這個詞稱呼不屬於那些，卻又有份與其存有的部分。他也宣稱，屬肉體的靈並沒有失去心思，魂的功能，靈也不會因著與魂和身體聯合的與昂不變的與它們不同；同樣的，動物的人（animal man）不會缺少心思或肉身；反而，保羅用許多不同的名稱向我們表明自由意志的功用。『沒有人能夠斷定那斷定萬有的』（1Cor 2.15）；如果人是有肉身和魂所構成的，他也被稱作屬靈的。一個人被肉體的情慾所引誘而玷污了他父親的床[1Cor 5.1]既沒有魂也沒有肉身。同樣的，一個身處於值得稱讚或卑鄙之行為間的人有份兩者；凡擁有心思的人也都被肉身包裹。但是，就像經上說的，投身與生活享樂的人們可以被稱作是屬肉體的和愛好整理的。那些具有辨別能力的人不能被其他的人所砍頭，因著他們道德行事為人的緣故被稱作屬靈人，就如同屬靈人超越屬肉體的人一樣。因為他希望動物的部分能夠透過美德而變得完美，不僅僅是藉著順服的生活方，而是有神在心思裡面來執行我們身體的功能，我們生活沒有任何方面是神所不在意的（『不論你是吃、喝或作任何事，都是為著捨得你榮耀而行』[1Cor 10.31]（根據英文重譯——譯者）。因此，我們身體的行動都不會不榮耀神。
Paul bestows a powerful blessing to the more lofty-minded Thessalonians: "God will sanctify you wholly, and may your spirit and soul and body be kept sound" [1Thes 5.23] [J.211]. In other words, everything pertaining to the body, soul and spirit is intent upon sanctification. His words are our own. If Apollinarius says [M.1237] that the mind, body and soul are separately blessed, and if he distinguishes the capacity of these blessings, how can the body which is subject to death be kept whole? How can any part be whole when it is worn out by abstinence, shrivelled up and unhealthy through harsh servitude? How can anyone maintain that poor Lazarus, teeming with wounds and consumed with puss, was not deprived of a blessing [Lk 16.10]? But in a marvelous way to experience a body covered with wounds was an ample blessing for Paul. For the spirit assists the body to maintain its soundness by make it refrain from being drawn down into compulsive behavior and disgraceful thoughts. And so, the flesh is not pulled down nor excited by the mind with bodily passions. The hymn of the three youths [Dan 3.86] show that the souls of the just together bless God while on the other hand, Apollinarius claims that the spirit existing apart from the soul cannot bless him. What praise can the soul alone offer to God without the mind's activity? As it has been often said, the soul devoid of mind is a beast deprived of the mind's rational function. What about the mind which is separate from our soul as [Apollinarius] claims? Let us concede that spirits have the capacity to praise God as when he says that spirits have minds. If another soul is believed to be separated from the mind, how can what is devoid of mind praise God? What hymn can please God when it lacks mind? What need does the soul have for mind [J.212] if praise as a hymn to God does not require the mind's assistance? But we do not learn these things from the interpretation of scripture. Instead, souls are like angels unfettered by the chains of the body as the Lord says [Lk 20.36], words which shows the dignity of souls united with angels. Angels are spirits. As the prophets says, "He makes angels his spirits" [Ps 103.4] with whom the three youths and souls of the just are deemed worthy to sing a hymn [to God].
保羅賦予心思更為突出的帖撒羅尼迦人一個更為有力的祝福：『神將會全然聖別你們，希望你們的臉能夠和魂和身體能夠被保守』[1Thes 5.23][J.211]。換句話說，所有關於身體、魂和靈的事物都當被聖潔。他的話也就是我們的話。如果亞波里拿流說[M.1237]心思、身體和魂分開被祝福，如果他區分了那些祝福的能力，那個必死的身體如何還能夠是完整的呢？任何透過嚴厲的奴役，而被節慾、枯萎和不健康消耗的部分怎麼可能還是完整的呢？怎麼可能有任何人相信可憐的拉薩路，全身滿帶傷口並因為膿瘡脫力，不配獲得祝福[Lk 16.10]嗎？在一種奇妙的方式中經歷了遍布傷口的身體反而成為了保羅的祝福。因為靈藉著幫助身體不被捲入令人著迷的行為和羞辱的想法中，保持堅定不移。並且，肉身不會被帶著肉身的情慾的心思所拖累或激動。三位年輕人的時光[Dan 3.86]表明公義之人的魂一同讚美神，在另一方面，亞波里拿流宣稱存在於魂之外的靈不能咱們祂。如果魂缺少了理性的活動，它能夠把怎麼樣的讚美獻給神呢？就好像經上常常說的，缺少了魂的心思就是一個被剝奪心思的理性功能的野獸。那麼，[亞波里拿流]宣稱的那個與我們的魂分離的心思又怎樣呢？讓我們承認，當他說靈有心思的時候，靈就有讚美神的能力。如果據信有另一個與心思分開的魂，那個無作用的心思又怎能讚美神呢？一首缺少心思的詩歌有怎麼能夠取悅神？若用詩歌讚美神不需要心思的幫助，魂需要心思的什麼幫助呢[J.212]？但是我們不是從聖經的解釋中學習到那些事物。相反地，魂就像從身體的鎖鏈中被解放出來的天使一樣，就像主說的[Lk 20.36]，那些狐表明魂的命運與天使聯繫在一起。天使是靈。就像先知所說的，『祂以天使為靈』[Ps 103.4]（根據英文重譯，應為Ps 104:4——譯者），三位年輕人和義人的魂與他們一同被認為配得[向神]唱詩歌。
The Savior said that we must worship God in spirit [Jn 4.23]. He does not denote the mind by the term "spirit;" rather, he means that we should not maintain any corporeal [M.1240] opinions regarding God. The Samaritan woman told the Lord that God should be worshiped on the mountain [Jn 4.20], a particular location, a statement based upon human opinion. In response to this error the text says that God is spirit, that is, incorporeal, and those persons who adore him cannot draw near to the incorporeal God in a corporeal fashion; rather, they should fulfil their worship in spirit and in truth. This text admonishes us about a two-fold ignorance: truth is accommodated to corporeal matters from figure and spirit from opinion. Because of this Paul assents to the truth; we should worship the Lord in spirit [Rom 1.9], neither in figure nor in the body. For him the flesh is not subject to God's law, and he directs an especially severe reproach against the error of such a teaching. Our free will enables us to engage in combat, make our [enemies] captive and to prevent us from being reduced to slavery. [J.213] If the mind does not exist, neither does free choice. Therefore Apollinarius says that the flesh is endowed with soul and free choice and admits that it is not destitute of mind. But regarding the flesh alone, he says that it contains the perfection of humanity. In this way the rest of man cannot be devoid of faculties belonging to his nature.
救主說我們必須在靈裡面敬拜神[Jn 4.23]。祂並不是用『靈』這個詞代表心思；反而，祂的意思是，我們不能對神保持任何物質[M.1240]的觀念。撒瑪利亞婦人告訴主，神應當在山上被敬拜[Jn 4.20]，一個特別的地點，這句話乃是根據人類的看法。為了回應這個錯誤，本文說神是靈，就是，非物質的，那些敬拜祂的人不能在物質的方式中接近非物質的神；反而，他們應當在靈和真理中完成他們的敬拜。這個本文勸告我們一種兩面的物質：真理用物質的事物為表號，以靈為意見。因著這個緣故，保羅升高到真理的層面；我們應當在靈裡面敬拜主[Rom 1.9]，不是在預表中，也不是在身體裡面。對於保羅，肉身不是神律法的目的，他特別嚴厲的責備那種教導的錯誤。我們的自由意志讓我們能夠進行戰鬥，俘獲我們的[敵人]並避免我們淪落成為奴隸。[J.213]如果心思不存在，自由意志也不存在。故此，亞波里拿流說肉身被賦予魂和自由意志，並承認心思並沒有被分解。但是，僅僅針對肉身，他說它包括人性的完全。其它的人類不可能缺少屬於他本性的官能。
"But man consists of three parts." This can be taken as true, provided we are not compelled to ascribe to it. He continues, "But the Lord as man is said to consist of three parts: spirit, soul and body." We find no fault with this statement. It is correct to assume that each aspect of our human nature pertains to that man [Christ]. "But the heavenly man"--and [Apollinarius] speaks here of the Lord--"is a vivifying spirit." We concur with this statement if it is understood correctly. For he who is united with the heavenly and earthly man has undergone a union for the better; he is no longer earthly but heavenly. The same must be said of the life-giving Spirit; he who performs good acts in us is the same life-giving Spirit. But let us see how our author makes use of such ideas. "If the heavenly man has every aspect of we who are of the earth, the Spirit also shares these earthly characteristics and is not of heaven but a receptacle of the heavenly God." [M.1241] Much in these obscure words comes across as weak and difficult to understand; nevertheless, [Apollinarius'] intention is easy to uncover. "If man [J.214] has no mind, he is heavenly; if he is whole, he is no longer heavenly but a receptacle of the heavenly God." What further offensive remarks do these words contain? Does he wish to restrict the divinity's perfection that the flesh deprived of mind can be united to the divinity? Or does he reckon that once we have consented to believe in the heavenly God he is not present in us as supposed but is in a different place with another name? Apollinarius says, "If man is a receptacle of the heavenly God, God is in heaven above, according to Ecclesiastes [Eccl 5.2, code B]." He who receives God in himself is rightly called heavenly, not earthly. If our author wishes to speak coherently, he clearly adds to his own words a correct teaching confirmed by his adversaries' wisdom.
『但是，人類是由三個部分所構成的。』這可以被當作是正確的，但是我們不會被迫去支持它。他繼續說，『但是主作為人被稱作由三個部分所構成的：靈、魂和身體。』我們在這句話中找不到缺點。假設那個人[基督]取得我們人性的每一個部分是正確的。『但是，那個屬天的人』，——[亞波里拿流]在此說的就是主——『是一個點活人的靈。』如果這句話被正確的理解，我們就附議這句話。因為那位將屬天和屬地之人聯合的，經歷了一個為了更好之目的的聯合；祂不再是屬地的，而是屬天的。同樣的話也當被用在賜生命的靈（life-giving Spirit）身上；那位在我們裡面行善工的那位就是那位賜生命的靈。但是，讓我們眼見我們的作者如何使用那個觀念。『如果屬天的人具有我們這些屬地之人的方方面面，，聖靈也分享那些屬地的特徵，不再是屬天的，而是屬天之神的容器。』[M.1214]這些怪異的字句都是艱澀難懂的；有鑑於此，[亞波里拿流的]動機很容易被發現。『如果人[J.214]沒有心思，他就是屬天的；如果他是政權的，他就不再是屬天的，而是一個屬天之神的容器。』這些話還包括了那些更為冒犯神的評論呢？難道他希望限制神格的完全，好叫被剝奪心思的肉身能夠與神格聯合嗎？或者他以為只要我們認可並詳細屬天的神，祂就不再如同我們所認為的，在我們裡面，而是帶著另一個名字出現在另一個地方嗎？亞波里拿流說，『根據傳道書[Eccl 5.2, code B]，如果人是一個屬天之神的容器，神在天上。』凡接受神進到自己裡面的就被正確的稱作屬天的，而不是屬地的。如果我們的作者希望把不同的東西結合起來說，他明顯的把被他的對手的智慧所認定的正確教義，加到自己的話裡面了。
But let us examine the text which now follows: "If we consist of three parts, [Christ] who consists of four parts is not a man but Man-God." The reader should not deride such a foolish, irrational statement; rather, let him deplore the mutilation of free will which is subject to so ridiculous an opinion. If the ever-vigilant power of God saves our human nature in its entirety, then God the Word is called Man-God. Just as fables indulge in making animals from different natures such as forms and names, for example, horse-deer, goat-stags and so forth, so the invention of this new fable reduces the divinity [J.215] to a ridiculous legend. The Apostle explicitly cries out that "Through a man came resurrection from the dead" [1Cor 15.21]. We do not have here a half man nor even something less than half a man; rather, Paul shows that [Christ's] nature does not suffer by the name [of man]. The minotaur created by imagination produces a disrespectful representation and perverts the mystery [of faith]. It gives rise to many occasions for deriding this faith by the introduction of unnatural elements. A person who ridicules our teaching rejects this absurd composition, whether the author's [M.1244] view or ours is more persuasive. No matter which position is taken, a name cannot express the composition produced from two natures. He who says that the flesh is from heaven no longer perceives it as flesh. However, flesh is governed by a life-giving nature and contains within itself a vivifying power which Apollinarius rightly calls man while he who has assumed flesh and manifested himself through it indeed has another nature. The name of the assumed flesh shows how much it differs in nature from the person who has assumed it. Therefore, how can the absurdity of a coined name impede the manifestation of God in the flesh? Apollinarius calls [Christ] a Man-God, a name he has cleverly devised. Mythology does not refer to a goat-stag when a goat is joined to a whole stag as a half goat; or on the contrary, this can happen in reference to a mixture of the animals when part of a stag is added to a whole goat. However, the combination of names denotes the participation of one nature [J.216] in another. Our author says that if man and God are united, whether fully by nature or in part, the resulting synthesis cannot but be absurd. If the Greeks learn such teachings from [Apollinarius] and then ridicule our mystery [of faith], we will indeed have occasion for sacrilege. The prophet invokes a curse against such persons, "Woe to those through whom my name is blasphemed among the gentiles" [Is 52.5]!
讓我們繼續檢視接下來的話：『如果我們是由三個部分所構成的，由四個部分構成的[基督]不是一個人而是人神（Man-God）』。讀者不當嘲笑那種愚蠢和非理性的宣告；反而，讓他為那個順從那種荒謬的觀點的自由意志而悲傷。如果神永遠警惕的大能在它的整全性中拯救了我們的人性，那麼神道（God the Word）就被稱作人-神（Man-God）。就像童話沉溺於用不同的性質，就像形狀和名字炮製出許多動物一樣，例如，馬鹿（horse-deer）、山羊牛（goat-stags）等等，被發明的這種新童話把神格[J.215]消減成為一種荒謬的傳說。使徒刻意高聲呼喊說，『死人復活因一個人來』[1Cor 15.21]。我們在此並不是得到半個人，更不是某種比半個人還少的東西；反而，保羅表明[基督]的性質並不會因著[人]的名字而受苦。幻想創造出來的人身牛頭怪（minotaur）產生一種不尊敬神的表現方式，並錯誤使用[信仰的]奧秘。它因著引入許多不成熟的元素，為這個信仰製造了許多被嘲笑的機會。凡責難我們教導的人也就拒絕這種荒謬的虛構之物，不管作者[M.1244]還是我們的觀點更聚會說服力。不管採用什麼立場，一個名字不能代表由兩個性質所產生的組合物。凡說肉身是從天上來的就不再認為它是一個肉身。不論如何，肉身乃是被賜生命的性質所管控，並包含一種賜生命的能力，在祂取得肉並將那具有另一個性質的自己透過肉身彰顯出來的時候，亞波里拿流正確的將其稱為人。那個被取得之肉身的名字表明其性質與那位取得它的位格是何等的不同。故此，那個阻礙身在肉身中彰顯創造出來的名字是何等的荒謬？亞波里拿流成[基督]為人—神，一個他精心設計的名字。當一隻羊與整隻鹿聯合而變成半隻羊的時候，神話不會稱之為山羊—鹿；或，相反地，當一部分的鹿被加到羊裡面的時候成為一隻混血的動物的時候，也會發生同樣的是。然而，把不同的名字結合起來為了表明一個性質有份[J.216]另一個性質。我們的作者說，如果人和神聯合，不過是完全或部分的性質，就會造成荒謬的混合物。如果希臘人從[亞波里拿流]那裡學到了那種理論，就會嘲笑我們[信仰的]奧秘，我們就會陷入一種褻瀆神的境地。先知咒詛那樣的人說，『讓我們的名在外邦人中被毀謗的人有禍了』[Is 52.5]！
Let us closely examine the words which now follow. "If something consists of two perfect elements, God neither has what man is, nor does man have what God is." If this definition claims that union [between divinity and humanity] results from both deficiency and perfection, do not [Apollinarius' followers] likewise have the audacity to say that man does not share God's nature and visa versa? In every way the divinity differs from the humanity, and no one can ever insinuate that the human nature is inferior to the divine nature. The [divinity] does not lack existence nor does [the humanity] exist imperfectly; each nature needs to be considered by itself and named with its own properties. When we hear of God, this name should convey a proper understanding of him; similarly, when we hear about man, we get an idea of his entire nature [M.1245]. Hence, the significance of these two names suffers no confusion so that one name can be understood by the other. Neither does the divinity signify the humanity nor visa versa; the name of each nature has its own connotation, and a name cannot be altered to represent the other. Both imperfection and perfection suggest different things, for we speak of perfection [J.217] by reason of its own proper nature and of imperfection by reason of its opposite nature. Neither name can depict man nor God; rather, to whatever object or designation a name may be applied, we clearly perceive fullness or deficiency. How can Apollinarius claim that if man is imperfect God is imperfect? This would result in a mutilation of our nature with respect to the divinity.
Let us now consider [Apollinarius'] following words: "Man himself cannot save the world, for he is subject to corruption, the common lot of humanity." I respond by saying that if human nature is good in itself, then the mystery [of the incarnation] is irrelevant. Since man is helpless before death, God did not offer salvation. Therefore, the light shines in the darkness through the flesh that [Christ] might destroy darkness through the same flesh. [Apollinarius] says, "God does not save us unless we are joined to him." The author of these words seems to have sound understanding and directs the soul to a clear judgment. According to him, combination signifies union of disparate natures. "Having become flesh, that is, man, [Christ] is united with us when, as the Gospel says, he became flesh and dwelt with us." These words are not contradictory unless immediately sown with darnel. We take the position of truth because [Christ] dwelt with us when he became flesh, that is, he became flesh by dwelling with us. If the flesh came from him who dwelt with us, the Word never had flesh before Gabriel [J.218] announced [Christ's birth] to the Virgin. [Apollinarius] falsely claimed that the humanity descended to us from above and existed as man before the creation of human nature by which the divinity was mixed with humanity. "But no one can destroy sin unless he was made a sinless man; neither [M.1248] can he destroy the reign of death in all men unless he died and rose as a man." Would that [Apollinarius] always speak the truth proclaimed by the Church!
Again [Apollinarius] reverts to his customary teaching and reproaches the Church's position because man is subject to passion and rebukes us with the following: "The death of man does not destroy death itself." Why does he say this? Because he shows that the Only-Begotten's divinity had died by his suffering on the cross together with his power and truth. As a result, in the period of three days [between Christ's death and resurrection] he had neither life, power, justice, light, truth nor divinity. Neither does [Apollinarius] say that one divinity had died and another was assumed since in many places he appears to have opposed Arius on this point. To confirm his argument, he maintains that the one divinity of the Trinity which had died was not something alien. I cannot see how anyone can doubt that the divinity is not subject to death, for the only death to which man is subject is the dissolution of his human constitution. Once our body has been dissolved, the soul does not perish along with the body; rather, that which is composed perishes while that which is uncomposed remains indissoluble. If death does not affect the soul, those persons who are ignorant of what they are talking about claim that the divinity is subject to death. I omit the rest of [Apollinarius'] position on this matter, for in the following words he ascribes [J.219] to the death of the divinity of the Only-Begotten: "Neither the death of a man destroys death nor the resurrection of him who had died. It is clear that God had died because Christ could not be restrained by death's bonds." I firmly believe that we should avoid this absurdity without further examination since any reasonable person can perceive this impiety and accurately destroy the notion of this bizarre God who endured death in his own nature. We should equally disregard his plausible words because his position radically differs from ours. [Apollinarius] tends to disinfect his lies and slanderously attach them to our position. He says, "We claim that Christ as God the Word did not exist from the beginning." But in the last days we affirm that the power of God, along with his wisdom, light, life and anything else belonging to Christ, became manifest through the flesh. To claim that there was a time when all these attributes [M.1249] manifesting Christ the Lord did not exist is in our estimation an intolerable sacrilege because [Christ's name] is denied. [Apollinarius] says that Christ did not exist from the beginning (Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God [1Cor 1.24] whose name implies everything honorable and befitting God), and that we are unable to comprehend such a great name. Just as when the rational nature of man is denied along with any other aspect of his nature, the name [man] is destroyed along with his other attributes. If Christ is the power, wisdom, stamp and effulgence [J.220] of God, [Apollinarius] rejects him together with the rest of our perceptions about him, for he claims that Christ did not exist from the beginning.
[亞波里拿流]在此翻轉了他慣有的教義，申斥了教會的立場，因為人具有情感，並用以下的話駁斥我們：『人類的死亡不能摧毀死亡本身。』他為什麼這樣說呢？因為他表面獨生者的神格藉著祂在十字架上的死，與祂的能力和真理一同死了。這就造成在三天中[在基督的死和復活間]，祂既沒有生命、能力、公義、光、或神格。[亞波里拿流]也沒有說一個神格已經死了，另一個被取得，因為他在這個點上與亞流是相對的。為了肯定他的這個論點，他堅稱三位一體的一個已經死了的神格不是某種不同的食物。我看不懂，任何人如何能夠懷疑神格不會死，因為人類能夠經歷的唯一死亡，就是他人類構成的分解。只要我們的身體一被分解，魂就不會與身體一同滅亡；反而，那個被組成的部分滅亡，那個非組成的部分仍然沒有被分解。如果死亡並沒有影響魂，那些對自己所說的話無知的人還宣稱神格是能夠死的。我跳過[亞波里拿流]在這個題目上的其他立場，因為在接下來的段落中，他描述了獨生者之神格的死亡：『一個人的死亡並他從死中的復活都不能摧毀死亡。很明顯的，因為基督不能被死的捆鎖拘禁，神死了。』我堅決相信我們必須毫不猶豫的避免這種荒謬的觀點，因為任何理性的人都能夠看見這種對神的褻瀆，並準確的摧毀這位在自己的性質中忍受死亡之怪誕神祗的觀念。我們也要同樣忽視他似是而非的話，因為他的立場與我們的立場間有著巨大的不同。[亞波里拿流]傾向於抹去他的謊言和褻瀆神的話，並將它們黏在我們的立場上。他說，『我們宣傳基督作為神道並不是從起初就存在的。』而是在末日，我們人的神的能力並祂的智慧、光、生命和其他屬於基督的事物，透過肉身彰顯。宣稱有一時所有那些彰顯基督主（Christ the Lord）的屬性都不存在，雖然在我們的估計中，但是是令人無法忍受褻瀆神的話，因為[基督的名]被否認了。[亞波里拿流]說基督在起初並不存在（基督是神的能力並神的智慧[1Cor 1.24]，祂的名暗示神一切尊貴並適合神的一切），以至於我們無法理解那麼偉大的名字。就好像當人理性的性質與他性質其他的方面一同被否定的時候，[人]的名字就與他所有的其他屬性一同被摧毀了。如果基督是神的能力、智慧、印像和光輝[J.220]，[亞波里拿流]完全拒絕祂和我們對於祂的看法，因為他宣稱基督並不是從起初就存在的。
With the divine scriptures as our guide we contemplate Christ together with the Father's eternity. God is always the Only Begotten God. He does not participate in divinity nor does he progress from a more humble condition to divinity. Thus the power, wisdom and every name befitting God is co-eternal with his divinity; anything which had never existed from the beginning can never approach the glory of the divine nature. On the other hand, we say that the name of Christ is contemplated from eternity with respect to his stature of only begotten [Son]. The manifestation of his name has brought us to this conclusion. Confession of this name includes the teaching on the Holy Trinity when we believe that this title appropriately manifests the individual Persons composing it. We do not presume to speak from our own opinion, so we offer the following prophetic words: "Your throne, O God, is forever and ever. Your royal scepter is a scepter of equity. You love righteousness and hate wickedness, therefore God, your God, has anointed you with the oil of gladness above your fellows" [Ps 44.7-8]. The term "throne" designates [God's] rule over all things. The rod of equity signifies righteous judgment. The oil of gladness, the power of the Holy Spirit by whom God is anointed as God, is the Only-Begotten by the Father since he has loved righteousness and hated injustice. If a time ever existed with no love of righteousness and no hatred of injustice, it would follow that a time existed without anointing because [Christ] loved righteousness and hated injustice. If it was clear that he always loved justice (for he had never despised himself since he is justice itself), he is considered as anointed. Therefore [J.221] Christ is just, not unjust, and never lacked being anointed. Christ, who had never been without anointing, always existed. Everyone [M.1252] whose heart has not been covered with the veil of the Jews believes that the Father anoints and the Holy Spirit is the anointing.
我們有聖經作為我們的指引，我們同時凝視基督與父的永恆。神總是獨生的神。祂不會有份於神格，祂也不會從一種更為卑微的境況向著神格發展。故此，能力、智慧和所有符合神的名字都是與祂的神格同永恆（co-eternal）；任何不從起初就存在的事物決不能靠近神性的榮耀。在另一方面，我們說基督的名從永遠就與祂作為獨生[兒子]的地位一同被凝視。祂名字的彰顯讓我們做出這樣的結論。承認這個名包括整個神聖三一的教訓，在同時，我們相信這個稱號合適的彰顯構成它的每一個個別的位格。我們不會根據我們自己的觀念論述，所以我們提供了以下先知的話：『神啊，你的寶座是永永遠遠的；你的國權是正直的。你喜愛公義，恨惡罪惡；所以神，就是你的神用喜樂油膏你，勝過膏你的同伴。』[Ps. 44.7-8]（應為Ps 45.6-7——譯者）『寶座』這個詞指明[神]在萬有之上的管制。正直的國權代表公義的審判。喜樂的油，神藉著聖靈的能力被膏為神，藉著父是獨生的，因為祂愛公義並憎惡不法。如果有任何一段時間沒有公義的愛，也沒有對不法的憎惡，就會造成有一段時間缺少了被膏者，因為[基督]愛公義並憎惡部分。很明顯的，祂總是熱愛公義（因為祂從未鄙視自己，因為祂就是公義本身），祂被認為是受膏者。故此，[J.221]基督是公義，不是不法，從未曾不是被膏的。基督，從未曾不是被膏的，是長存的。凡心沒有被猶太人的幔子遮住的人[M.1252]相信父是膏的那位，聖靈則是正在膏的那位。
How can [Apollinarius] claim that we disavow Christ's eternal existence? Such a declaration is false because we confess the eternity of Christ and have always understood the teaching which [Apollinarius'] has devised with regard to [Christ's] flesh. But we know that Christ existed before the ages and is the same Lord after his passion. As Peter says to the Jews, "God has made both Lord and Christ this Jesus whom you have crucified" [Acts 2.36]. We do not confess two Christs and Lords in our contemplation of one Christ; since God is naturally the Only-Begotten God, Lord of all, King of creation and Maker and Castigator of those who have lapsed, not only has he patiently guided our fallen nature from sin and did not reject us from fellowship with him, but he has also restored us to life. He is life itself. Once evil has come to fruition at the end of human life, [Christ] united himself to our humble nature and offered us a remedy; he assumed a human form and became man. As he says to his disciples, "I am in you and you in me" [Jn 14.20], that is, he is the very same person whom he made and united to himself. [Christ] was eternally exalted and elevated man's humility, for he who transcends every lofty thing needs no [J.222] exaltation.
[亞波里拿流]怎麼能夠宣稱我們不承認基督永遠的存在？那種宣告本身就是假的，因為我們承認基督的永恆性並總是理解[亞波里拿流的]教訓在關於[基督的]肉身方面偏離了。但是，我們知道基督在諸世代前就存在了，並就是在受苦後的那位主。就像彼得告訴猶太人說的，『故此，以色列全家當確實的知道，你們釘在十字架上的這位耶穌，神已經立他為主，為基督了。』[Acts 2.36]在我們凝視的那一位基督中，我們不承認有兩位基督與主；因為神本來就是獨生的神、萬有的主、創造的王和那些已經消失之物的塑造者與懲罰者，祂不僅僅耐心的引導我們墮落的性質脫離罪，也沒有拒絕我們與祂交通，祂還把我們恢復到生命中。祂就是生命自己。只要邪惡來造成人類生命的結束，[基督]將自己與我們卑微的性質聯合並未我們提供了解藥；祂取得了一個人的樣式而成為人。就像祂告訴門徒的，『我在你們裡面，你們也在我裡面』[Jn 14.20]，就是說，祂就是那位祂所創造並與自己聯合的那個人。[基督]永遠被高舉，也提升了人的被我，因為那超越一切傑出事物的那位，不需要被高舉[J.222]。
Christ is both Lord and Word, and that which he united he assumed into his divinity. The Lord is not reconstituted as Lord but is Lord in the form of a slave. The statement, "There is one Lord, Jesus Christ, by whom all things exist" [1Cor 8.6] may also apply to Christ who was clothed before the ages with the glory of the Spirit (for his anointing symbolizes this). After the passion Christ is adorned with the man whom he united to himself by anointing. "Glorify me," as if he were to say, "Anoint me with the glory which I had with you before the world was created" [Jn 17.5]. But the glory which existed before the world, all creation, all the ages and which glorified the Only-Begotten God, is, in our opinion, the glory of the Spirit. Our faith teaches [M.1253] that the Holy Trinity alone exists before the ages. "He who existed before the ages" [Ps 54.20], as prophecy says of the Father. Of the Only-Begotten the Apostle says "by him the ages were made" [Heb 1.2]. And the Only-Begotten God's glory which existed before the ages became manifested in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, what belongs to Christ from the Father before the creation of the world also belongs to man who is united to Christ at the end of the ages. Scripture says, "Jesus of Nazareth whom God has anointed with the Holy Spirit" [Acts 10.38]. That we may not expose ourselves to the slanderous claim that Christ was not always the Only-Begotten God, we say that he always existed both before and after his dispensation for mankind. Man existed neither before him nor after him but at the time of this dispensation. Neither did man exist before [Christ's birth from] the virgin nor after his return to heaven, for the flesh retained its own characteristics. "If we knew Christ according to the flesh we know him now [J.223] no longer" [2Cor 5.16]. The flesh does not remain immutable because God appeared in the flesh; rather, since man is mutable and God is immutable, the divinity is immune from mutability nor does it change for better or for worse (for divinity is free from such alteration). But human nature in Christ can change for the better, that is, from corruption to incorruptibility, from mortality to immortality, from temporal to eternal existence and from bodily appearance to an existence which no form can express.
基督既是主和道，祂將祂所取得的聯合入祂的神格中。主並不是重新被構成為主，而是在奴僕的樣式中的主。這個宣告，『只有一位主耶穌基督，萬有藉祂得以存在』[1Cor 8.6]也能夠用在基督身上，祂在諸世代前就穿上了聖靈的榮耀（因為祂的被膏就是這個意思）。基督在受苦後帶著那個藉著被膏而與他聯合的人一同被尊崇。這就好像他在說，『榮耀我，用榮耀膏我，就是在創造世界前我與你同有的容易』[Jn 17.5]。然而存在在世界、所有的被造之物、諸世代之前的榮耀，榮耀了獨生的神，我們認為，就是聖靈的榮耀。我們的心意教導[M.1253]只有神聖的三一存在在諸世代之前。『那位存在在諸世代前的』[Ps 54.20]，就是先知論到的父。唯有獨生的，使徒說到，『諸世代藉著祂被造』[Heb 1.2]。存在於諸世代之前獨生之神的榮耀彰顯於聖靈中。故此，從父而來，在創造之前屬於基督的一切也屬於那位在世代的末了與基督聯合的那個人。經文說到，『神已經用聖靈膏了拿撒勒人耶穌』[Acts 10.38]。覺我們不會曝露在那些毀謗性的宣告中，就是基督不總是獨生的神，我們說，祂總是存在於祂人類的分賜（dispensation for mankind）之前並之後。那個人既不存在在祂之前，也不存在於祂之後，而是存在於這個分賜的時期中。那個人也不存在於[基督從]童女[出生]之前，也不是存在於祂回到天上之後，因為肉身仍然保有其特徵。『如果我們根據肉身認識基督，我們就不再[J.223]認識他』[2Cor 5.16]。肉身不再是不可改變的，因為神在肉身中顯現；反而，因為人是會改變的，神是不改變的，神格不受改變性的影響，祂也不會改變的變成更好或更差（因神格不會有那種的變化）。在基督裡的人性可以變得更好，就是從會朽壞變成不會朽壞、從比死的變成不死的、從暫時變成永恆的存有並從身體的鮮明變成一個沒有任何形式能夠表達的存有。
Because [Apollinarius] has us say that man suffers, not God, let us now offer our response. We confess the divinity to be present in [humanity] which is prone to suffering while that which is impassible cannot suffer. Let us attempt to clarify our position and offer our [M.1256] own view. Human nature subsists by union of the intellectual soul with the body. However, both have their existence from a certain material substance. Man's material existence has its origin in the divine power; if anyone supposes his existence does not spring from this creative power, matter is sterile and does not come to life through [God's] creative activity. Just as this creative power brings man into existence by a union of body and soul, so does the power of the Most High exercise itself with regard to the Virgin's immaculate body in an immaterial fashion through the Spirit's vivifying where incorruptibility assumes matter in the virgin's body to create a fetus. And so, the New Man is formed who first and alone received [J.224] this means of existence. He was formed according to God, not man, since the divine power equally pervaded his entire constitution. As a result, both parts of his constitution partook of divinity with a harmonious composition of soul and body.
When the man [Christ] was born, the divinity of him who was begotten did not cease because it existed before all time; nevertheless, once begotten, he appeared as man with respect to human birth. Similarly, he who lives forever did not fail to rise; he rose to life through the divine power. The divinity did not rise (for it did not die), but fallen human nature in the person of Christ experienced resurrection. If the divinity lacks neither birth nor resurrection, [Christ] clearly did not suffer according to his divinity; instead, the divinity existed in him who underwent pain in union with [the humanity which] suffered since he had appropriated this suffering to himself. The divine nature, as it is said, appropriately consists of soul and body which were united because "the gifts of God are without repentance" [Rom 11.29]. Both soul and body are not separated but remain united. Nothing can sever man's affiliation with God except sin; his life is without blemish when union with God cannot be sundered.
Since both soul and body do not have sin, the divine nature is certainly present [M.1257] in them. But when death separates the soul from the body, this composite whole [J.225] is divided while the uncomposite suffers no such fate; rather, the [divine nature] fully remains present in each part. A sure sign of God's presence in the body is the flesh's incorruptibility after death, for God is incorruptibility itself. The body is not separate from the soul, hence the thief had entered paradise by means of his soul [cf. Lk 23.39-43]. Since the mystery of the divine power is fulfilled in the two components of our human nature, [God's] vivifying energy take effect in a manner connatural to each part: through the flesh to the body and through the soul to the soul (I mean the rational part, not the irrational; for the irrational part belongs to the animal, not to the human). Hence right from the beginning the divinity is united to both body and soul. It works through the resurrection in him [Christ] who fell asleep, and so the very same Christ who had died [Rom 6.4] has risen from the dead. He who is king before all the ages came to birth when the angels announced that great joy had come to all the people at the savior's nativity. Scripture appropriately says, "he who is Christ the Lord" [Lk 2.11] and according to Gabriel, the Holy Spirit will come to the Virgin and the power of the Most High will overshadow her. It is therefore reasonable to say that the One who is born is Christ and Lord: Lord through the power of the Most High and Christ through the anointing of the Spirit. He who is eternal was not anointed at that time; instead, scripture says of him, "You are my son; today I have begotten you" [Ps 2.7]. The word "today" signifies the present located between two dimensions of time, past and future.
因為魂和身體都都沒有犯罪，神性當然在它們裡面[M.1257]。但是，當死亡分類混合身體的時候，這個整全的構成[J.225]就被分割了，但是不被構成的事物就不會面對那樣的命運；反而，[神性]完全留在每一個部分裡面。肉身在死後的不敗壞性就是一個神在身體裡面的確實跡象，因為神本身是不會敗壞的。身體不能從魂分開，因為進入樂園的強盜乃是藉著他的魂[cf. Lk 23.39-43]。因為神聖大能的奧秘在我們人性的兩個部分中得到應驗，[神]賜生命的能力與每一個部分同性質（connatural）的方式產生效果：透過肉身到身體，並透過魂到魂（我知道是理性的部分，而不是不理性的部分；因為不理性的部分屬於動物，不屬於人類）。所以，神格從一開始就與身體和魂聯合。神格藉著復活在那位睡著的[基督]裡面運行，讓那個那位死過的基督[Rom 6.4]從死裡復活。那位在諸世代前為王的，在天上宣告大喜樂在救主的出生的時候臨及萬民的時候粗聲。聖經正確的說道，『祂是基督主』[Lk 2.11]，並根據加百列，聖靈臨及童女，至高者的能力覆蓋她。故此，聖經合理的說那位出生的是基督和主：主藉著至高者的能力，基督藉著聖靈的膏抹臨及世界。那位是永恆的在當時並未被膏；相反的，聖經說到，『你是我的兒子，我今日生了你』[Ps 2.7]。『今日』這個詞意味著在時間的過去和未來間的所在。